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Introduction
The investigation into logical form and structure of natural sciences and mathematics covers a
significant  part  of  contemporary  philosophy.  In  contrast  to  this,  the  metatheory  of  normative
theories is a slowly developing research area in spite of its great predecessors, such as Aristotle,
who discovered the sui generis character of practical logic, or Hume, who posed the “is-ought”
problem. The intrinsic reason for this situation lies in the complex nature of practical logic. The
metatheory of normative educational philosophy and theory inherits all the difficulties inherent in
the general metatheory, but has also significantly contributed to its advancement. In particular, the
discussion on its mixed normative-descriptive character and complex composition has remained an
important  part  of  research  in  educational  philosophy  and  theory.  The  two  points  seem  to  be
indisputable. First, the content of educational philosophy and theory is a complex one, connecting
different disciplines. Second, these disciplines are integrated within the logical form of practical
inference or means-end reasoning. On the other hand, the character of consequence relation in this
field, although generally recognized as specific, represents an unresolved problem, a solution of
which requires a sophisticated logical theory and promises to influence the self-understanding of
educational philosophy and theory.
Kant, Herbart, Mill: from a noble ideal to an art
Immanuel  Kant  (1724–1804),  who  occasionally  taught  the  course  on  pedagogy  at  the
University of Könisberg, in total four times after receiving his professorship, envisaged the theory
of education as a most desirable but difficult aim. 
An outline of a theory of education is a noble ideal, and it does no harm if we are not immediately in
a position to realize it. One must be careful not to consider the idea to be chimerical and disparage it
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as a beautiful dream, simply because in its execution hindrances occur. (Kant, 2007:440)
In  1809  Johan  Friedrich  Herbart  (1776–1841)  was  elected  to  the  chair  of  logic  and
metaphysics, formerly held by Kant. Herbart outlined the form and content for the “noble ideal” of
educational science. 
Pedagogics  as  a  science  is  based  on ethics  and psychology. The  former  points  out  the  goal  of
education; the latter the way, the means, and the obstacles. (Herbart, 1901: 2)
The  quotation  shows  that  educational  theory  is  formed  by  the  disciplinary  integration,  not
disciplinary differentiation. Although in Herbart’s works no explicit analysis of the logical form of
the science of education had been given, several important aspects of it became clearly visible.
Firstly, the science of education (SE) is a logical consequence of ethics (E) and psychology (P).
Secondly, the consequence relation connects normative or “ought to-be/ought to-do” statements
(goals)  and factual  or  “is”  statements  (ways,  means,  obstacles),  as  premises,  with  a  normative
statement in the role of conclusion. Thirdly, this connection is instrumental. 
The exact content of the Herbartian science of education remains underdetermined since it can
be  conceived  in  different  ways.  If  taken  in  the  wide  sense,  the  science  of  education  (SEW)
encompasses both ethics and psychology, together with their logical consequences: SEW=Cn(EP)
where Cn(X) is the set of all and only those sentences that are logically implied by the set X. The
set XY is composed of all and only those sentences that belong to the set X or the set Y; the set 
X–Y has all and only those sentences that belong to the set X but not to the set Y.  If understood in
the narrow sense,  the science of  education (SEN)  includes  only the proper  educational  content:
SEN=SEW–(Cn(E)Cn(P)). If conceived in the intermediate sense, the science of education (SEM)
comprises, in addition to proper educational content, only those parts of ethics and psychology that
are  logically  relevant,  i.e.,  required  for  obtaining  an  educational  conclusion:  
SEM=SEN{p: p(EP) and there is a q such that qSEN and qCn((EP)–{p})}.
John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) differentiates science from art: the former consists of assertions
on matters of fact, while the latter gives precepts and is thus characterized by the prevalence of
imperative mood (J. S. Mill, 1858: 588). Education is an art and, as such, inherits its logical form. 
The art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the science. The
science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated its
causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a theorem of the combination of circumstances by
which it could be produced. Art then examines these combinations of circumstances, and according
as any of them are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The only one of
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the premises, therefore, which Art supplies, is the original major premise, which asserts that the
attainment of the given end is desirable. Science then lends to Art the proposition (obtained by a
series of inductions or of deductions) that the performance of certain actions will attain the end.
From these premises Art concludes that the performance of these actions is desirable, and finding it
also practicable, converts the theorem into a rule or precept. (J. S. Mill, 1858: Book VI, Ch. XI, p.
589)
In Mill’s account art  is identified with means-end reasoning, in a way which closely resembles
Aristotel’s description of deliberation (bouleusis) in Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b. Mill’s concept of
art  and Hebart’s concept  of  the science of  education  agree in  view of  instrumental  connection
between the conclusion and the “major premise” but diverge in regard to the source of normative
force. According to Mill, any art, including education, supplies the goal by itself, while, according
to Herbart, the goal of education is borrowed from ethics. The science of education in Mill’s sense
is a normative theory or art (SEA) which has two distinguishable parts: educational goal/s (G), and
logical  consequences  following  from  educational  goal/s  conjoined  with  a  relevant  descriptive
science (S). The problem of exact determination of theoretical content is left unresolved, like in
Herbart; a plausible interpretation may be that Mill conceives education in a narrow sense, i.e.,
excluding the descriptive science: SEA=Cn(GS)–Cn(S).
Frankena, Brezinka, Suppes: philosophical and practical  unity versus
openness
Aristotle’s distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning (the first one leading to the
formation of a new belief and the second to a new desire or intention) was reactualized in the 20th
century and the research into practical syllogism (more accurately, practical inference for it need not
have exactly two premises) has been under way since 1950s. Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001)
deemed it as one of Aristotle’s best discoveries, but the one whose true character has been obscured.
Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003) went even further in recognition of its theoretical value and
assigned to  practical  inference  a  dominant  position  in  the  methodology  of  social  sciences  and
humanities as the source of their methodological autonomy. 
Practical reasoning is of great importance to the explanation and understanding of action. (...) the
practical  syllogism  provides  the  sciences  of  man  with  something  long  missing  from  their
methodology:  an  explanation  model  in  its  own  right  which  is  a  definite  alternative  to  the
subsumption-theoretic  covering  law  model.  Broadly  speaking,  what  the  subsumption-theoretic
model is to causal explanation and explanation in the natural sciences, the practical syllogism is to
teleological explanation and explanation in history and the social sciences. (von Wright, 1971:27)
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Practical inference plays a pivotal role both in normative theories and in descriptive sciences
of man. It was in the context of revived interest in practical inference that William (Wiebe Klaas)
Frankena (1908–1994) reopened the discussion on the logical form of normative philosophy of
education. According to Frankena (1965), its minimal logical structure is given by a chain of two
practical syllogisms, i.e., by a practical polysillogism; an example is given in Table 1. Although
Frankena (1965:9) refers to Mill as the source of his inspiration, his “two-tier model” presents a
reconciliatory synthesis of Herbart’s and Mill’s account. Frankena, unlike Mill, does not take the
goal as self-imposed by the art of education but, like Herbart, as derived from wider theoretical
context  in  which  ethical  considerations  provide  the  normative  source.  A  diagrammatic
representation of the Frankena model is given in Figure 1.
The  “complete  normative  philosophy  of  education”  (PE),  as  Frankena  called  it,  covers
normative educational philosophy (EP) and educational theory (ET). Its logical form is given by the
formula PE=EPET, which can be further analyzed. Educational philosophy is the consequence of
basic value statements or goals (V) and scientific nomological statements (S): EP=Cn(VS). The
reduction of educational philosophy to only those consequences that do not belong to initial sets
gives  the  set  (EP|D)  of  normative  statements  on  valuable  dispositions,  
EP|D=Cn(VS)–(Cn(V)Cn(S)). Educational theory uses the reduced educational philosophy (EP|
D) and couples it with relevant scientific nomological statements (S*) in order to deduce statements
about valuable instrumental actions (precepts, in Mill’s terminology), ET=Cn(EP|DS*). It is an
interesting fact that Frankena takes educational theory to be determined not by three but by four
sets: the set of basic value statements, the set corresponding to the reduced educational philosophy,
and  the  two  sets  of  relevant  scientific  statements.  Therefore,  he  does  not  presuppose  that  the
practical consequence (Cn) is a strongly transitive relation allowing for the removal of intermediate
conclusions, i.e.,  the relation where  Cn(Cn(X)Y)=Cn(XY) holds. If the consequence relation
were transitive, then a complete philosophy of education would be determined by the set of value
statements  and  the  two  sets  of  nomological  statements,  i.e.,  then
PE=Cn(Cn(VS)S*)=Cn(VSS*) would hold. 
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Figure 1. A modified depiction of the Frankena’s model. A node lying immediately below heads of arrows is a joint
consequence of nodes above tails of arrows. The dotted line connects premises. The two parts in the minimal structure
have been termed here as ‘educational philosophy’ and ‘educational theory’.
(P1) Value V ought to be the case. (P2)  Disposition  D  is  a  necessary
condition for value V.
(C1)=(P3) Therefore, disposition D ought to
be the case.
(P4)  Action  A  is  a  sufficient
condition for D. 
(C2) Therefore, action A ought to be done.
Table 1.  A semi-formal example of practical polysyllogism. 
The science of education takes different forms depending on their presupposed philosophical
background.  There  have  been,  inter  alia, hermeneutical,  critical,  and  empirical  theoretical
orientations. According to Habermas (1972:308), this is not a pluralism of competing theories but of
knowledge types, exemplified by empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic, and critically oriented
sciences, constituted by the three types of cognitive interests: technical, practical, and emancipatory.
For Wolfgang Brezinka (born 1928), a representative of the empirical orientation, it is only
descriptive use of language that is permitted in the science of education. The prescriptive use of
language characterizes normative philosophy of education and practical pedagogics, both of which
consist of “mixed normative-descriptive” statements. Frankena’s concept of a “complete normative
philosophy of education” results in a huge theory, the one reminiscent of Dewey’s identification of
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philosophy with general theory of education.
If  we  are  willing  to  conceive  education  as  the  process  of  forming  fundamental  dispositions,
intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined  as the
general theory of education. (Dewey, 2001:316)
In contrast  to  Frankena’s all-encompassing view on the philosophy of  education,  in  Brezinka’s
fragmented,  three-partite  composition  of  educational  knowledge  it  is  neither  philosophy  nor
science, but only educational practice that can act as an integrative force (cf. Figure 2).
To the  extent  that  an  epistemologically  justified  synthesis  of  actual  knowledge  and  normative
demands is sought, this can only be achieved in practical pedagogics. Practical pedagogics, however,
cannot be said to be a unified theoretical system of pedagogical knowledge, but can rather be viewed
as  a  praxis-oriented  selection  of  existing  theoretical  knowledge  on  the  one  hand  and  possible
valuations and norms on the other. (Brezinka, 1992:243–244)
Figure 2. In Brezinka’s view a practical pedagogics (PP) is a consequence of a normative philosophy of education (NP)
and science of education (SE), but without a complete theoretical unification; (PP) is a proper subset of Cn(NP SE)
but not identical to it: PPCn(NP SE). 
Patrick Suppes (1922–2014) points out the existence of conflicting normative principles. For
example, the “antinomy of method” (Suppes, 1971:286) is an inconsistency of principles, one of
which  requires  the  maximization  of  learning  and  problem-solving  techniques,  while  the  other
demands the maximization of content. The discovery of jointly unsatisfiable normative principles is
the major task of analytical philosophy of education.
An examination of inconsistencies [in implicit principles] can be, I believe, one of the more fruitful
avenues  of  progress  in  the  philosophy  of  education.  Consistency  of  principles  is  a  necessary
condition that almost all men accept. It can be imposed and exploited without further analysis of the
epistemological status of the principles. The close articulation of principles in the philosophy of
education can have the kind of beneﬁcial effects found in other philosophical endeavors, ranging
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from the foundations of mathematics to contemporary formulations of decision theory and normative
economies. (Suppes, 1971:285)
Suppes’s discussion  of  antinomies  reveals  that  a  conclusion  arrived  at  by  a  piece  of  practical
reasoning can be defeated by adding a normative premise. This fact sheds doubt on the claim that
the  conclusion  corresponds to  a  stronger  type  of  normative  judgment  like  a  directive,  precept,
recommendation,  instruction,  advice,  etc.  Typically, the conclusion of  a practical  inference is  a
weak suggestion (Žarnić, 1999).
Practical consequence relation: an open question
The content of action-oriented educational philosophy and theory is of “mixed normative-
descriptive”  type.  This  is  not  the  only  difference  that  divides  them  from  empirical  sciences.
Another, equally prominent difference lies in the nature of consequence relation.
The properties of consequence relation were for the first time explicitly defined in 1930s by
Alfred Tarski (1901–1983). The Tarskian consequence relation fits the language used in empirical
sciences and mathematics. It is a relation between sets of sentences of a denumerable language and
its  “structural  properties”  are:  reflexivity,  weak  transitivity,  monotony,  compactness,  and
“explosiveness”.  It  has  been  argued  by  a  number  of  researchers  that  the  consequence  relation
underlying the practical inference is not a Tarskian one. In particular, the non-monotonic character
of practical consequence relation (the defeasibility of conclusion by premise addition) has been
widely acknowledged and discussed in philosophical logic. 
Instead of reporting on results achieved, let us turn towards an open question of the non-
transitivity. Consider Frankena’s “two-tier model”! If the consequence relation is strongly transitive,
then the complete normative philosophy of education is determined by the three sets: the set of
basic  values  (V),  and  the  two sets  of  scientific  statements  (S  and S*);  the  set  of  intermediate
conclusions on valuable dispositions (cf. C1 in Figure 1) is superfluous and can be left out. Weak
transitivity,  Cn(Cn(X))=Cn(X),  together  with  monotonicity,  Cn(X)Cn(XY),  implies  strong
transitivity, Cn(Cn(X)Y)=Cn(XY). In the shorthand notation, if the practical consequence (Cn)
is not strongly transitive, then it is possible that Cn(Cn(VS)S*)Cn(VSS*).  This possibility
shows that different normative philosophies of education can be built upon the same basis; it also
demonstrates,  assuming  that  normative  value  is  inherited  from basic  values,  that  the  practical
conclusion must be weaker in its normative force than the  basic normative premise. 
There are at least two reasons for claiming non-transitivity of the consequence relation in the
normative context. Texts from the normative philosophy of education usually display enthymemic
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arguments, and enthymemic consequence is  not transitive.  Nevertheless, enthymemic arguments
can be expanded to their complete form where omitted premises are explicitly stated. Therefore, we
must turn to another, irremediable property to account for non-transitivity. 
In its typical form action-oriented practical inference consists of three sentences: the “major
premise” stating which disposition ought to be cultivated,  the “minor premise” about a kind of
causal relation between a type of action and the disposition, and the conclusion stating which token
of an action type ought to be performed or omitted. Causal relation is usually conceptualized in
terms  of  sufficient  and  necessary  conditions.  Consider  the  minimal  structure  of  a  chained
instrumental reasoning (such as the one in Table 1)! Firstly, a basic value is connected to a valuable
disposition via an assertion that the disposition is a precondition for the value realization. Secondly,
the  valuable  disposition  is  connected  to  an  action  that  ought  to  be  done  via  an  assertion  that
performance of the action is  a precondition of attainment of the disposition.  The transitivity of
consequence relation will hold only if the two causal preconditions create a chain, but this need not
be  the case.  For  example,  concatenation  of  a  necessary  condition  for  a  value  with a  sufficient
condition for a disposition does not yield a sufficient or a necessary condition for the value, and, so,
the direct transmission of normative force from the value to an action will fail. Further research
should reveal whether transitivity can be preserved against the background of a theory of causality
that takes into account the nexus of the more fine-grained relations such as the relation of INUS
condition (the concept has been introduced by John Leslie Mackie), which is an insufficient but
necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result, or the relation
of SUIN condition (introduced by James Mahoney et al.), which is a sufficient but unnecessary part
of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome. For example, suppose the following
hold: the communicative rationality is valuable; the self-reflection is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for the flourishing of communicative rationality; the use of Socratic method is a sufficient
but not a necessary condition for the development of self-reflection. The Socratic method would
then  stand  in  a  weak  condition  relation  to  the  communicative  rationality  and  this  relation,
resembling but not identical to the SUIN condition, might provide a channel of value inheritance
from the communicative rationality to the Socratic method.
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